Wednesday, December 28, 2011

AZMEX UPDATE 2 26-12-11

Note: this the final of the azmex surge


Note: some background on El Inge, et al.

The capture of El Inge, member of El Chapo organization in the Sierra
de Durango
He was arrested in Culiacan, Sinaloa, did not provide his name and
was presented this morning at the premises of the SIEDO
Aurora Vega

MEXICO CITY, December 26 .- Mexican Army troops captured the head of
plaza in the state of Durango of the Sinaloa cartel, led by Joaquin
Guzman Loera, El Chapo.

The Ministry of National Defense (Sedena) today at the Office of
Special Investigations into Organized Crime Felipe "N" alias El Inge,
who was part of the first level of that cartel operators, was
responsible for the transfer of drugs in Durango kept the place free
of rival organizations, primarily Los Zetas.

Sedena information indicates that the detainee, who reserved the
name, but made public today, was conducting security operations when
El Chapo visited the institution, which was followed, even said to
live there.

These operations were to protect not only the life of the jefe, but
the whole group control of the Sinaloa cartel, thus performing
actions to avoid at all costs the capture of leaders near Guzman Loera.

The detainee was attributed to multiple acts of violence such as
clandestine burials, kidnappings, extortion, burning businesses and
homes and is presumed narco graves to where they have found more than
200 bodies.

Note that this arrest is the second major operator of the Sinaloa
cartel to be stopped by the Army this year, since last October Noel
Salgueiro was captured Narváez, El Flaco Salgueiro.

For operational control exercised by the lieutenant in Durango of El
Chapo, he is considered in the same hierarchical level of El Flaco

El Flaco was arrested by the Mexican army in Chihuahua and is noted
as the founder and leader of new people, the armed wing of the cartel.

According to the Department of Defense, El Flaco Salgueiro was one of
the main responsible for carrying out criminal acts that led to
extreme violence in Chihuahua, by maintaining a constant
confrontation with the criminal group La Linea, the armed wing of the
Juarez cartel.

According to the Department of Defense, El Flaco Salgueiro besides
being the Chihuahua Square chief extended his activities to the
states of Guerrero, Durango and Sinaloa, starting within the criminal
organization in Veracruz for El Chapo Guzman in 2007.

In El Flaco Salgueiro is ranked as one of the main generators of
violence in Chihuahua, especially in Ciudad Juarez, when he played in
that square with the organization of Amado Carrillo Fuentes and his
group of assassins

He is credited under his control had various criminal gangs, as
shaped by Artistas Asesinos and Mexicles.

The Sinaloa cartel and the Juarez cartel has had a direct
confrontation over the disputed so-called Golden Triangle, an area in
which converge the states of Durango, Sinaloa and Chihuahua.

This confrontation has been added to by the organization of the
Zetas, who are also trying to take over this area.

The region known as Golden Triangle, mainly in the highlands, is
considered one of the areas of operation of the leaders of the
Sinaloa cartel, Joaquin Guzman Loera mainly and Ismael El Mayo Zambada.

Almost duranguense

Joaquin El Chapo Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa cartel is one of the
kingpins most wanted by authorities in Mexico and the United States:

- He is included in Forbes magazine's list of the most powerful and
richest men in the world.

- According to accounts, including the Archbishop of Durango, Hector
Gonzalez, El Chapo lives partly in the mountains of Durango, in the
Golden Triangle.

- In April 2009, Hector Gonzalez told reporters that "Guanacevi
later, that's where El Chapo lives, we all know, less the authority."

- In November 2010, the archbishop returned to his old ways, saying
that El Chapo "is everywhere, the same can be here than on the
boulevard where there is the El Grande (a seafood restaurant) or be
in Huazamota or Tamazula, or San Andres del Teul in Zacatecas, where
he has large properties. "

- The Golden Triangle is an area of ​​difficult access and where
they are located make sophisticated clandestine synthetic drugs.

- In July 2007, El Chapo Guzman was allegedly married in La
Angostura, a town in Canelas, Durango, the heart of Golden Triangle,
at the wedding were local authorities and former officials of Sinaloa.
2011-12-26 08:40:00

AZMEX EXTRA 2 26-12-11


Note: of interest, 6.8 rounds recovered.

Are "arsenal" in Villa Real

Hermosillo, Sonora (PH) rifles, magazines, cartridges, sling,
tactical gear, police uniform of a corporation and two people were
seized by agents of Creditable State Police (PEA) and the Army on
Thursday in an address of the fractionation Villas del Real.

The detainees are Perla Ibarra Fabiola Gomez and Abraham Blanquel
Corona, 21 and 23 years, who were seized in a house in the street las

At the site, members of the Corona Blanquel extensive operations with
two rifles 7.62x39 mm caliber better known as "goat horn" with
sling and
magazines supplied with 40 and 30 rounds of ammunition.

Also found four navy blue jackets with the emblems of the Federal
129 rounds of ammunition caliber 40,
48 of caliber 45,
38 of 45 "impact",
91 of 7.62.x39
83 cartridges 223.

Also seized 179 of 6.8 caliber cartridge
50 rounds of 9 mm,
28 cartridges of 5.7 mm caliber,
a cartridge caliber 38 super,
a mortar shell shaped charge,
a retractable metal baton and
police handcuffs.

In reviewing the case that brought the woman, seized 24 cartridge
magazines of various sizes, rounds of ammunition, two envelopes with
white powder granules similar to "crystal" and a bag containing 72.8
grams of an herb similar to marijuana.

In the seizure, said Corona Blanquel belong to a group of organized
crime, trying to intimidate to avoid arrest, but did not convince the
military and police.



RE: AZMEX SPECIAL 17-12-11 Between Loyzaola in Cd. Juarez, and
Mex. army in Sonora, some people starting to feel the pain.

A Crime Fighter Draws Plaudits, and Scrutiny
Published: December 23, 2011

Katie Orlinsky for The New York Times
"You can't apply a strategy from a desk. You have to apply it in the
street." - Julián Leyzaola, Chief of Police in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico

Times Topic: Mexican Drug Trafficking

JUST a few days into his new job as the police chief here in Mexico's
longtime murder capital, Julián Leyzaola said, he received a phone
call from the boss of a crime syndicate named La Linea. Mr. Leyzaola
had been threatened before, quite often, in his last job as the head
of public security in Tijuana.

But this call was different. It came from a former police officer,
who called the chief's cellphone to suggest a partnership. "It's
Diego," said the crime boss, José Antonio Acosta Hernández. "I'm at
your service."

Chief Leyzaola, 51, a trim former military officer with a flair for
drama, smiled at the recollection. The call came in March. In July,
he arrested El Diego and his main collaborators, including several
police officers. "I don't dialogue with delinquents," he said.

But ever since that victory over La Linea, Chief Leyzaola — already
Mexico's most renowned and controversial policeman — has been under a
spotlight that keeps getting hotter. Positive and negative
developments have intertwined: violence has declined in Juárez, with
murders down by around a third over the last year; at the same time,
complaints of human rights abuses by the police have increased,
including some against the chief himself; and now that La Linea is
gone, one of its rivals, the Sinaloa cartel, has become more powerful.

This appears to be the Leyzaola package. A similar dynamic played out
during his time in Tijuana from 2008 through 2010, and just as
residents there are still trying to make sense of his approach, the
people of Juárez are also now scratching their heads with cautious awe.

"We're seeing the results we asked for," said Federico Ziga,
president of the Ciudad Juárez restaurant association. "Not everyone
agrees on the cause, but the results are there."

IN a wide-ranging interview at his office here, Chief Leyzaola said
he had long aimed to destroy the "narco dream" by showing that the
authorities could take away "their guns, their cars, their drugs,
their money." Like a boxer or wrestler, he treats his tough-guy image
as a necessary tactic. In Tijuana, he punched a dead cartel gunman in
the face as bystanders watched. There and here, he insists on calling
criminals "mugrosos," or slimeballs.

"You can't apply a strategy from a desk," he said, sitting behind a
desk with just a few papers and a fruit smoothie. "You have to apply
it in the street."

Specifically, he says he has calmed Juárez by dividing the city into
sectors and locking down troubled areas, starting with the central
business district where La Linea was based. For months at a time, he
said, he deployed the police to stop and question everyone going in
and out of certain neighborhoods.

Critics contend that while the effort destroyed La Linea, an
especially violent gang implicated in the 2010 massacre of teenagers
at a house party and the killing of a United States Consulate worker,
it has also led to unjustified arrests for anyone young or poor who
looks like trouble.

"It's a systemic violation of human rights," said Gustavo de la Rosa,
a Chihuahua State human rights investigator. "More than 5,000 illegal
detentions were reported in the months of October and November."

Chief Leyzaola has also been accused of personally beating prison
inmates with a two-by-four after a riot at the local jail in July. An
American who has since been released said he saw the chief hitting

More recently, two other prisoners accused the chief and seven other
officers of killing a friend after the three men were arrested
together in November.

Though his office did not respond to requests for comment on these
specific beating and homicide allegations, Chief Leyzaola has not
denied using arrests and "intense, harassing patrols" to break the
link between petty criminals and organized crime. Young people, he
said, must understand the consequences of claiming to be a big shot.

Many residents do not seem to mind. They had been complaining for
years about local thugs taking advantage of anarchy and fear to
extort their neighbors. Even human rights advocates like Mr. de la
Rosa have acknowledged that there are "pervasive interests"
determined to take down Chief Leyzaola, who survived his latest
assassination attempt in June.

YET, his legal problems continue to pile up. Mr. Leyzaola is now
scheduled to appear before a judge to address allegations tied to his
time in Tijuana. A recent report from the Human Rights Commission
there argued that he and several subordinates tortured four police
officers suspected of corruption in 2010. An earlier report linked
him to the deaths of five people accused of killing police officers
in 2009.

He has denied those allegations, insisting that the claims are an
effort to smear him. He also denies having anything to do with the
case of four young men here in Juárez who were found dead in a tunnel
a few weeks after witnesses saw them detained by the police on March 26.

"I had only 10 days on the job when this started," he said. "What did
we do in this case? I was the one who insisted that those responsible
are punished."

Chief Leyzaola (who failed to mention that only a few of the 15
officers accused in that case have been arrested) says he is mainly
struggling with a young and ill-equipped police force. He has already
fired about 200 officers, and he said more were likely to be purged.
In addition to the challenge of recruiting — the department now has
about 2,300 officers, he said, down from 3,000 a few years ago — he
highlighted the challenge of training the ones he hires: "About 1,800
of the 2,300 officers have no more than two years of service."

Many say they are inspired by their boss. Inside the police station
lobby, they point proudly to a wall of newspaper clippings on
arrests. Such strong morale is certainly a rarity in many Mexican
police departments. But experts say that Chief Leyzaola has yet to
grasp the limits of his show-how-tough-we-are approach.

"Policing is not about personalities — it's about procedures and
institutions," said David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border
Institute at the University of San Diego. "When Leyzaola is gone, as
he inevitably will be at some point, what will be left behind? That's
the key question."

Transparent processes for investigations and promotions matter more
than tough talk or even high profile arrests, experts say. And while
crime is down in both Tijuana and Juárez, it is not clear how much
this has to do with Chief Leyzaola. Mr. Shirk said it likely had more
to do with cartel dynamics — a truce or shift in power, with one
group gaining an overwhelming edge. Some Sinaloa cartel members on
trial in the United States have said they tried to work with Mexican
and American authorities so they could defeat La Linea.

Mr. de la Rosa added that the drop in crime might also just be
exhaustion. Thousands of presumed cartel hired killers have died here
over the past few years.

But no matter what the cause, or the fallout, Chief Leyzaola seems
unlikely to play a role any different from what he knows.

"I'm a soldier; I'm a nationalist," he said, leaning forward in his
chair, as if addressing a television camera. "I have one objective:
to fight delinquency."



Note: Leyazola, whatever else, appears to be getting getting
results. Kinder, gentler? Mexico's drug war doesn't seem to be too
conducive to that. Especially if the cartels prevail.

Suspects: Juárez chief of police killed friend
by Alejandro Martínez-Cabrera \ El Paso Times
Posted: 12/17/2011 12:00:00 AM MST

JUAREZ -- The city's chief of police, Julián Leyzaola, is being
accused of aggravated homicide by two men who filed a complaint
against him with the Chihuahua state prosecutor's office.

This week, Jorge Regulo Valdez and Sergio Andrés Palacios, arrested
on homicide charges and jailed at Cereso prison, accused Leyzaola and
seven other municipal police agents of beating one of their friends
to death.

City officials were surprised by the accusations. They had not
received an official complaint.

"We can't give our position on something that has only been discussed
in the media, but we will respond immediately to any instructions
from the prosecutor's office to cooperate with the investigations,"
said municipal police spokesman Adrián Sánchez.

City Mayor Héctor "Teto" Murguía said Thursday during a news
conference that he hadn't heard the new accusation against Leyzaola.

But the ombudsman for Chihuahua's Human Rights Commission in Juárez,
Gustavo de la Rosa Hickerson, said that whether the claims are true
or not, the implications could be equally serious

It is difficult to believe that a police chief would be involved so
directly in an act of violence of that magnitude, de la Rosa said.
But if it is proved to be true, it would be of great concern for the
city, he said.

If the claims prove false, he would not discard the possibility that
a coordinated effort could exist to discredit the police chief, de la
Rosa said.

"Everybody is attacking Leyzaola," de la Rosa said. "It's probably
because there are perverse interests that want to discredit him. It's
either a conspiracy against Leyzaola, or it's a very dangerous
conduct (with bad implications) for the city."

In their complaint, Valdez and Palacios said they were detained by
municipal police agents on Nov. 9 along with a friend, Andrés "El
Borre" Padilla, and an unidentified minor.

They were later taken to an uninhabited house, where, they claim,
they were beaten and interrogated about their employers and their
pay. The beating continued in a police substation, where Valdez and
Palacios claim they saw Leyzaola and the seven agents beat Padilla to

"We saw when the Chief of Police Julián Leyzaola and the officers
that detained us beat Jorge Andrés Padilla until they killed him,"
the men said in the complaint. "And after killing him we saw and
heard Mr. Julián Leyzaola order the officers to go dump the body at
the Camino Real road to get rid of the evidence."

Valdez and Palacios said they decided to file the complaint once they
knew they would be out of the municipal police department's reach
inside Cereso prison, which recently became administered by the state

"Now that we know that our lives are not at risk inside the state
Cereso É we ask for justice for our friend," the complaint said.

De la Rosa said it's urgent for the Chihuahua state prosecutor's
office to corroborate or refute the accusation.

"It's the prosecutor's office responsibility to determine if the
accusation is true or false. If this matter is not clarified, we're
going to have serious problems with the remaining doubts," he said.

This is not the first accusation of excessive force against Leyzaola
since he became police chief in March. Last month, a Human Rights
Commission of Baja California Norte report said Leyzaola tortured and
violated the human rights of several people under his custody during
his time as police chief in Tijuana.

And last week, Shohn Huckabee, a 24-year-old U.S. citizen who was
incarcerated in Juárez for drug possession and recently released,
accused Leyzaola of beating an inmate with a piece of wood during a
search operation inside the prison.

"He sat everyone down. He came and beat people. I saw it with my
eyes. He broke a 2-by-4 over a guy's back. (One officer) said, 'Here
you go, boss, here's another one.' It was ruthless. It was a
difficult circumstance to watch," Huckabee said in an interview last

Valdez and Palacios' accusation is also the latest complaint against
the municipal police regarding abuse of authority.

Several protesters filed a compliant against Mexico's National
Commission for Human Rights after a peaceful demonstration in early
November turned into a violent confrontation with municipal police

Days later, the Red por la Infancia (or the Network in Defense of
Children) filed another complaint against police before Chihuahua's
Human Rights Commission after 15 young people who were promoting a
youth campaign reported that they had been detained, beaten and
humiliated by municipal police agents.

The municipal agents "do not assume with sincerity the need to
respect the law. The only thing they've understood is that they have
the strength to break the law with impunity," de la Rosa said.

And Leyzaola tolerates, or maybe even promotes, that type of
behavior, he added.

"Municipal police agents work under the false notion that they are
the law and hold all the power, and it's the responsibility of the
head of the agency to change that," he said. "It's not a priority for
(Leyzaola) to end with this culture."

Alejandro Martínez-Cabrera can be reached at; 546-6129.



Note: computer english for now, will work on better translation
later if anyone needs.

Alliance against Zetas and the Juarez cartel
Miguel Angel Vega
Monday December 19, 2011

What set off the war

In early 2008 exploded into the Sinaloa cartel conflict largest on
record, driven by capturing the Mochomo Alfredo Beltran Leyva. The
explosion brought nightmarish consequences to the bosom of the most
powerful criminal organization Mexico, causing an escalation of death
as never before seen in the areas of organized crime anywhere in the

Along with this internal war, Joaquin El Chapo Guzman and Ismael
Zambada competed on May one of the most important places for the
smuggling of drugs to the criminal group then most violent and bloody
all over the country: the Juarez cartel.

The Juarez was a war that claimed the lives becoming more and more
people and where people of the Viceroy Vicente Carrillo Fuentes,
seemed to have every chance of winning, since they controlled the
police and political spheres of the city and Chihuahua, Patricia
Gonzalez even the prosecutor repeatedly been accused of protecting
the Juarez cartel and its armed wing, La Linea.

Chapo was then that the mechanism by which it sought to kill their
enemies in a way that does not even have to put your hands. The
formula, which even the most brilliant of his enemies had conceived,
was to involve the United States Government for them to take over
their opponents. And it was.

With initiative and a display that would have envied the president
Felipe Calderon, Chapo authorized his people to establish
communication with a federal agency of that country, in this case the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE acronym in
English) , to reveal information about their enemies, as thus would
the U.S. government who would be responsible to go for them. In plain
terms, the Yankees would be the armed wing of the Sinaloa cartel. The
response was immediate.

Rivers of blood

The alliance worked for both parties, except for citizenship, which
was in the crossfire and began to fall victim to an endless war
between the Sinaloa cartel and its allies of ICE, against the Juarez

The mass killings were swift and ejecusiones document reached more
than twenty people in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua and communities in the
highlands and Creel, who was then known as a tourist destination
rather than a war zone.

"It's become a hell, and we see for after all," said Father Javier
Avila Ríodoce Aguirre, pastor of the church in Creel, where the
November 15, 2008, a command executed 13 people who apparently worked
for the Juarez cartel.

The numbers were gradually shooting: 2 000 400 executions in 2008,
some 2 000 944 deaths in 2009. Indeed, these two years coincided with
the time when the United States served as the armed wing of the
Sinaloa cartel. He also agreed that escalating operating death with
Fast and Furious, directed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and
Snuff (ATF), which allowed the entry of thousands of weapons into
Mexico, and whose recipients were people of Chapo Guzman.

That is, the U.S. not only acted as the working arm of the Sinaloa
cartel against its enemies, but also armed to the teeth and somehow
agreed not to touch it.

The narcobanners

The attacks only a cartel by the governments of Mexico and the United
States were so obvious that the group had no other Viceroy conclude
that the Mexican government protected the Chapo.

It was then that narcobanners launched a campaign in Ciudad Juarez
and different parts of the republic that required the president to
attack all the cartels equally and not only protect one of them: the
Sinaloa cartel.

Little or nothing was known then that the people of Chapo Guzman was
working with U.S. agencies, who were passing information about his

But not only demanded narcobanners equity, people also accused of
murdering Chapo "innocent people" in Ciudad Juarez and other parts of
Mexico, where he also began to intensify the levels of violence after
the U.S. agreed with the cartel Sinaloa.

According to data from the PGJE the state of Sinaloa, in 2008 the
number of violent deaths was 166 thousand, while 2009 were 252
thousand. Those numbers, as statistics of Chihuahua, meant records in
both states. Coincidentally, this occurred when starting the pact
between the Sinaloa and the U.S..

Debacle of a covenant

Possibly the pact would have continued indefinitely, but the March
19, 2009, in an exclusive area of ​​Mexico City, elements of the
Mexican army arrested Vicente Zambada Niebla, then considered one of
the main leaders of the Sinaloa cartel.

The arrest of Vicentillo also meant an eventual break between the
United States Government and the Sinaloa cartel, since Zambada Niebla
was the first high-profile drug dealer admits to being a DEA
informant, allegedly in exchange for immunity and freedom for the
transfer of drugs from Mexico to the United States.

From that moment everything changed and the U.S. responded that they
had never offered immunity to the son of Mayo Zambada. However, the
defense emphasized that Zambada Niebla was no evidence in the
possession of the prosecution that were necessary for the Vicentillo
receive a fair trial, otherwise it might be possible to go free if
the judge Ruben Castillo determined that "it was committing an
injustice to him. "

According to the Vicentillo, dealings between the Sinaloa cartel and
the United States dating from before 2004, when Loya Humberto Castro,
chief of Chapo, enabling it to provide information on the enemies of
freedom Chapo in exchange for free racking of drugs from Mexico to
the United States.

In March 2010, another Sinaloa cartel informant, Jesus Manuel Fierro
Mendez, admitted in federal court in El Paso Texas, have been
"spokesman" of the Chapo Guzman, who often had telephone
conversations and meetings with ICE agents .

In all cases, outside Loya Castro, fog or Fierro Zambada Mendez, the
Sinaloa cartel was touched by the authorities of Mexico or the United
States. Or at least that's what the testimony given point.

In the case of Zambada Niebla, explain the motions presented by the
prosecution, was the Mayo Zambada who have authorized his son to meet
with DEA ​​agents because their intention was to move away from
drug trafficking. But being arrested Vicentillo, his legal team
uncovered a cesspool of corruption and favoritism, which included a
formula for the DEA to take the money confiscated from drug cartels
and bring it back to Mexico where he would wash through its operating .

A spokesman Joaquin Chapo Guzman made a pact with ICE
Betrayal by impunity
Kennis and Jason Andrew McGahan *

Loya Humberto Castro, Joaquin advisor Chapo Guzman and Vicente
Zambada Niebla, the son of Ismael Zambada May, are not the only
senior members of the Sinaloa cartel who served as liaison between
the criminal organization and U.S. agencies.

In March 2010, Jesus Manuel Fierro Mendez, a member of the Sinaloa
cartel and ex-captain of the police in Ciudad Juarez, El Paso
testified that he had been "spokesman" of the Chapo Guzman in
numerous telephone conversations and some meetings with U.S.
officials Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE acronym in English).

"There were two of us who were, say, as the voice-Fierro said Mendez.
We spent all the information. But we received this information,
obviously, higher levels. " He explained also that Chapo Guzman had
allowed to meet with ICE and report the activities of enemy cartels.

- Have you ever asked ICE about the veneers? He was asked during his
testimony in court.
She was not allowed and never asked me.

Until the day he was arrested, Fierro Mendez saved in your cell phone
number of an ICE agent that he knew only as Roger.

Fierro Mendez was arrested by the DEA on October 10, 2008 at his home
in Ciudad Juarez. After being extradited to Indianapolis, Indiana to
face charges of trafficking cocaine, sealed an agreement with the
Federal United States. He avoided being sentenced to 27 years in
prison in exchange for testifying against former associates of the
Sinaloa cartel, Manuel Chavez and Fernando Betancourt Ontiveros

Process testimony obtained a copy of Iron Mendez surrendered March 4,
2010 before the Court Western District of Texas. That day appeared as
a witness by the Government of the United States. Unless otherwise
indicated, U.S. Attorney Russell D. Leachman is the interlocutor in
the extracts from the transcript of the Court cited in the text.


Five years before appearing as a witness in El Paso, Fierro was a
corrupt police captain in Ciudad Juarez. According to the DEA said
the day he was sentenced, "while supervising the transport and
distribution of cocaine, also served as an officer of Puma Unit in
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Puma Unit is a narcotics task force that
operates within the Juárez Police. "

Fierro, whose nickname in the drug underworld of Juarez Puma was also
admitted receiving drug money while he was a police captain. In the
Court repeatedly referred to those bribes as "payroll".

Q. - And when he says "the list" are you referring to the bribes to
the police?
A. - It is not a bribe. It is a payment for a specific job. Is an
amount that is paid monthly to the Police to do the job they want.

Q - Okay. What is expected of the police once it is in "the list" as
you say?
A. - I do or not do what interests the drug traffickers.

Q. - And just for the ladies and gentlemen here understand what this
means, if you are a police officer in Mexico, and say that is not on
"the list", what would happen to a person within the corporation
police ?
A. - If you are not in "the list" if someone is not in "the list",
that person still must obey orders given. Because if you do not obey
orders, that person would be killed.

The Sinaloa cartel recruited Mendez Fierro who had resigned by then-
Police to increase their influence with local police and with their
old friends the Mexican Army. The fragile alliance of Chapo Guzman
with the Juarez cartel, known as The Federation was breaking. In
anticipation of the final rupture, the Chapo sent high-level
emissaries to secure local support of men like Fierro Mendez, to
launch a surprise military offensive against his former partner.

Q. - How did you meet Fernando Arambula?
R. - In late 2007 I was asked to meet with him to develop some
strategies for drug trafficking.

Q. - Who asked you meet him?
R. - Mayito.

Q. - And when he says Mayito, do you know with other names?
R. - M10 and Mario Nunez.

Q. - And you met with Mr. Arambula and Mario Núñez Mayito?
A. - Yes.

Q. - And when did the first of these meetings?
R. - I first met Mayito, probably in October 2007. And in November of
2007 I met with Fernando.

Q. - And was anyone else in these meetings?
A. - Yes.

Q. - Who else?
A. - There were many meetings, and each had different people. In the
first one I attended was the commander Fernando Loya, was the M10,
M11 his brother, Flais, Cuba, etc. I do not remember.

Q. - And what was the purpose of these meetings?
A. - At that time began to show a confrontation over the place and
the intention was to make arrangements to keep that place.

Q. - When speaking of the square keep, what you mean?
R. - To have control over the city and throughout the state.

Q. - And what it means to have control of the square?
R. - To be able to ... to maintain the ability to give orders over
the law to federal, state and municipal governments, and have a clear
field for drug trafficking can continue without problems.

Fierro Mendez testified that the main objective of the Sinaloa cartel
in the short term was to eliminate the line, the faction of the
Juarez cartel who claimed territorial control over the entire state
of Chihuahua. He said, however, that the Chapo clarified that
wherever possible he wanted to avoid a violent confrontation.

The strategy was to exhaust the last chance to hurt Line. Fierro
Mendez explained in court, "the aim was to eliminate the line of any
possible way out is legal or not. That is, either through the Army or
providing information to ICE, this was a legal way, or braking
information that came from the highest ranks of the Line. "

The prosecutor asked if the Sinaloa cartel tried to use ICE to
eliminate their rivals of La Linea. "That's right," was the answer.

After he broke Federation, members of the line were previously loyal
to the Juarez cartel began to pass information to the Sinaloa, Fierro
said Mendez. He noted that much of the information that was aimed at
the line came from former members of that organization changed their
loyalties when the violence erupted. Fierro said that these
individuals had a name: they were known as The New People. When
pressed to define the term, said that the new people was "The People
Against The Line".

Guzman Loera SENT

Fierro Mendez also said that he crossed the border to meet with ICE
agents in U.S. territory. To show the jury how easy it was to Fierro
contact ICE Mendez, Attorney Leachman recovered the names of two
members of this agency registered with the Mexican cellular wore the
day he was arrested. One of the agents working for the ICE office in
Phoenix, Arizona, the other in El Paso, Texas.

Fierro Mendez contacted the ICE in April 2008, offering his services
as an informant for sensitive intelligence material on the Sinaloa
cartel's enemies, especially the Juarez cartel.

"Originally I was willing to work with any U.S. agency, any Federal
agency, either the FBI, DEA or ICE" he explained.

Fierro Mendez and contacts ICE agreed to cooperate only in words,
there was no written agreement between them, he said. "I would give
them information they needed, and they corroborate information they

-Besides these, were there other services performed for the ICE?
Asked the prosecutor.
-I contacted some people who are in the business of arms trafficking

Fierro Mendez notify ICE when a senior member of La Linea was
arrested in Mexico with the hope that the United States prevented his
prompt return to the battlefield in Juarez. He said U.S. authorities
had the power to delay the release from prison of members of a cartel
enemy. He also stated that the Sinaloa cartel ICE provided the
information to make arrests on U.S. soil. He said, however, if the
ICE carried out the arrests. He explained that he had set limits on
what could be said about its agreements with ICE.

The M10 and another member of the Sinaloa cartel, Julio Porras, were
those who made arrangements for Fierro Mendez could meet with ICE
agents in the United States. "I do not know how they did it," he
testified, "but through them I could enter the ICE without questions."

In cross-examination with Martha Eskesen, Arambula Ontiveros'
attorney, Fierro Mendez explained the nature of their dealings with
the ICE.

Q. - What are you looking for when he embarked on talks with ICE agents?
R. - arrests were made here in America.

Q. - Well. And remember those with whom he met when he began to deal
with the ICE?
A. - Yes.

Q. - Who were these agents?
R. - The agent that I was in charge was Roger.

Q. - And Roger was the actual name of agent or his nickname?
A. - I do not know.

Q. - Well. So was the only name I had for this person?
R. - The name he gave me.

Q. - Well. And there was some other agent with whom you also tried?
R. - Joseph.

Q. - And you know the name of Joseph?
A. - No.

Q. - Well. Were there more ICE agents with whom you have a deal?
A. - Whenever there was a meeting, there were at least two ICE
agents, but I do not know any of the others.

Q. - Well. And when you met at that time with them was not in custody
or imprisoned ... and there was no legal problem. Right?

A - Correct.
Q. - You were, and if I am using an incorrect term, tell me, 'you
were on a mission to come Chapo to provide information. Right?

A. - Yes.


Fierro Mendez is not the first member of the Sinaloa cartel who
admits to having had regular telephone contact or meetings with U.S.
law enforcement agents. Loya Humberto Castro, one of the main
advisors of Chapo Guzman, maintained regular telephone contact with
the agent Manuel Castanon, the DEA office in Tijuana. The agent's
name Castanon was in the cell record Loya Castro.

The full name of the agent Castanon was revealed in a motion filed by
U.S. prosecutors in the case of Vicentillo. The motion included a
half page section titled Continuous Castro Loya communication with
U.S. officials. This is a chronicle of his telephone conversations
with the agent Castanon between October 2010 and August 24, 2011.
Before the prosecution disclose your name in the records of the Court
by the defense Castanon agent appeared as the "agent Manny"-the same
way that Fierro Mendez could not provide anything more specific than
"Roger" to identify your ICE contact in Phoenix.

Alvin Michaelson, a member of the defense of Vicentillo, told Judge
Ruben Castillo in an open session of the Court Loya Castro has been
in contact with the agent Castanon, "virtually on a daily basis for
almost ten years, there are thousands of reports supporting our
position, Your Excellency. He told us about e-mails, meetings, phone
calls. He had to hand the phone number of Mr. Manny. "

Court proceedings in the trial on drug charges against Zambada Niebla
provided U.S. officials revealed that senior members of the Sinaloa
cartel information that used to smite his enemies cartels.

In a legal document, dated September 9, 2011, the U.S. Federal Bureau
Loya admitted that Castro was a confidential informant record in the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA, for its acronym in English).

Zambada's legal team revealed the connection Fog Loya Castro filed a
legal motion in March. The Federal United States denies, however,
that the agreement with Castro Loya imply a guarantee of legal
immunity for the leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, as alleged in the
Court Vicentillo lawyers.

The connections between Fierro Loya Mendez Castro and extend beyond a
similar relationship with U.S. law enforcement. Fierro Mendez said in
court that Loya saw "three four" meetings convened by the Sinaloa
cartel in Mazatlan to prepare for drug shipments to Juarez. Fracture
of the Federation brought a great disruption in the supply of drugs.
Everlasting lieutenant, Fierro succinctly highlights the two main
objectives of the meetings in Mazatlan: "One was to keep hitting the
line in every way possible. The other was organized to at least be
able to cross the drugs. "

* Taken from the magazine Proceso.

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Fwd: The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism AZMEX

A AZMEX Must Read
Note:  This report by Dr. Neumann adds to what the AZMEX reports have also been piecing together.
A destabilized or failed Mexican state is clearly on the agenda of these players, as that would have so
impact on the USA.  Take into account also the extensive access these states and groups have to international arms markets. The Cuban and
Venezuelan new capabilities in weapons and munitions production.  The dots are connecting.

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Foreign Policy Research Institute" <>
Date: December 26, 2011 11:34:28 PM MST
Subject: The New Nexus of Narcoterrorism

Foreign Policy Research Institute
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
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by Vanessa Neumann

December 26, 2011

Vanessa Neumann is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute and is co-chair, with FPRI Trustee Devon
Cross, of FPRI's Manhattan Initiative.

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Religious Relations Across The Taiwan Strait: Patterns, Alignments, And
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Jordan: Between The Arab Spring And The Gulf Cooperation Council
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Complete Table of Contents and links to all articles:


                     by Vanessa Neumann

Press stories, as well as a television documentary, over the
past two months have detailed the growing cooperation
between South American drug traffickers and Middle Eastern
terrorists, proving that the United States continues to
ignore the mounting terrorist threat in its own "backyard"
of Latin America at its own peril. A greater portion of
financing for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, is coming from Latin America, while
they are also setting up training camps and recruiting
centers throughout our continent, endangering American lives
and interests globally. Some Latin American countries that
were traditional allies for the U.S. (including Venezuela)
have now forged significant political and economic alliances
with regimes whose interests are at odds with those of the
U.S., particularly China, Russia and Iran. In fact Iran and
Iran's Lebanese asset, "the Party of God," Hezbollah, have
now become the main terror sponsors in the region and are
increasingly funded by South American cocaine.

Venezuela and Iran are strong allies: Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
publicly call each other "brothers," and last year signed 11
memoranda of understanding for, among other initiatives,
joint oil and gas exploration, as well as the construction
of tanker ships and petrochemical plants. Chavez's
assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N.
sanctions has got the attention of the new Republican
leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, resulting
in the May 23rd, 2011 announcement by the US State
Department that it was imposing sanctions on the Venezuelan
government-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)
as a punishment for circumventing UN sanctions against Iran
and assisting in the development of the Iran's nuclear

Besides its sponsored terrorist groups, Iran also has a
growing direct influence in Latin America, spurred by three
principal motivations: 1) a quest for uranium, 2) a quest
for gasoline, 3) a quest for a base of operations that is
close to the US territory, in order to position itself to
resist diplomatic and possible military pressure, possibly
by setting up a missile base within striking distance of the
mainland US, as the Soviets did in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
FARC, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda all have training camps,
recruiting bases and networks of mutual assistance in
Venezuela as well as throughout the continent.

I have long argued that Latin America is an increasing
source of funding for Middle Eastern terrorism and to
overlook the political changes and security threats in the
region with such geographic proximity to the US and its
greatest source of immigrants is a huge strategic mistake.
It was inevitable that South American cocaine traffickers
and narcoterrorists would become of increasing importance to
Hezbollah and other groups. While intelligence officials
believe that Hezbollah used to receive as much as $200
million annually from its primary patron, Iran, and
additional money from Syria, both these sources have largely
dried up due to the onerous sanctions imposed on the former
and the turmoil in the latter.

A recent New York Times front-page article (December 14,
2011) revealed the extensive and intricate connections
between Hezbollah and South American cocaine trafficking.
Far from being the passive beneficiaries of drug-trafficking
expats and sympathizers, Hezbollah has high-level officials
directly involved in the South American cocaine trade and
its most violent cartels, including the Mexican gang Los
Zetas. The "Party of God's" increasing foothold in the
cocaine trade is facilitated by an enormous Lebanese
diaspora. As I wrote in my May 2011 e-note, in 2005, six
million Muslims were estimated to inhabit Latin American
cities. However, ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon
regions of Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present easily exploitable
terrain over which to move people and material. The Free
Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile; Maicao, Colombia; and Colon,
Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical
support for terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru
offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. In addition,
Cuba and Venezuela have cooperative agreements with Syria,
Libya, and Iran.

Some shocking revelations into the global interconnectedness
of Latin American governments and Middle Eastern terrorist
groups have come from Walid Makled, Venezuela's latter-day
Pablo Escobar, who was arrested on August 19, 2010 in
Cucuta, a town on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. A
Venezuelan of Syrian descent known variously as "El Turco"
("The Turk") or "El Arabe" ("The Arab"), he is allegedly
responsible for smuggling 10 tons of cocaine a month into
the US and Europe-a full 10 percent of the world's supply
and 60 percent of Europe's supply. His massive
infrastructure and distribution network make this entirely
plausible, as well as entirely implausible the Venezuelan
government did not know. Makled owned Venezuela's biggest
airline, Aeropostal, huge warehouses in Venezuela's biggest
port, Puerto Cabello, and bought enormous quantities of urea
(used in cocaine processing) from a government-owned
chemical company.

After his arrest and incarceration in the Colombian prison
La Picota, Makled gave numerous interviews to various media
outlets. When asked on camera by a Univision television
reporter whether he had any relation to the FARC, he
answered: "That is what I would say to the American
prosecutor." Asked directly whether he knew of Hezbollah
operations in Venezuela, he answered: "In Venezuela? Of
course! That which I understand is that they work in
Venezuela. [Hezbollah] make money and all of that money they
send to the Middle East." A prime example of the importance
of the Lebanese diaspora in triangulating amongst South
American cocaine and Middle Eastern terrorists, is Ayman
Joumaa, a Sunni Muslim of the Medell¡n cartel with deep ties
with Shiites in the Hezbollah strongholds of southern
Lebanon. His indictment made public on Tuesday "charges him
with coordinating shipments of Colombian cocaine to Los
Zetas in Mexico for sale in the United States, and
laundering the proceeds" (NY Times, Dec. 14, 2011).

The growing routes linking South American cocaine to Middle
Eastern terrorists are primarily from Colombia through
Venezuela. According to an April 2011 report by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela is the most prominent country of
origin for direct cocaine shipments to Europe, with the
cocaine coming mainly from Colombia, primarily the FARC and
ELN terrorist groups. Shipments to Africa, mostly West
Africa, gained in importance between 2004 and 2007,
resulting in the emergence of a new key trans-shipment hub:
centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, stretching to Cape
Verde, The Gambia and Senegal, thus complementing the
already existing trafficking hub of the Bight of Benin,
which spans from Ghana to Nigeria. As the cocaine is
transported through Africa and into Europe, its safe passage
is guaranteed (much as it was in Latin America) by terrorist
groups-most prominently, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The cocaine
can also travel from Latin America's Tri-Border Area
(TBA)-bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este,
Paraguay; and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil-to West Africa
(particularly Benin, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, with its poor
governance and vast archipelagos) and then north into Europe
through Portugal and Spain or east via Syria and Lebanon.

Hezbollah's traditional continental home has been the TBA,
where a large, active Arab and Muslim community consisting
of a Shi'a majority, a Sunni minority, and a small
population of Christians who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria,
Egypt and the Palestinian territories about 50 years ago.
The TBA, South America's busiest contraband and smuggling
center, has long been an ideal breeding ground for terrorist
groups, including Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda-the
latter since 1995 when Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad first visited.

Hezbollah is still active in the TBA, according to Argentine
officials. They maintain that with Iran's assistance,
Hezbollah carried out a car-bomb attack on the main building
of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires on
July 18, 1994, protesting the Israeli-Jordanian peace
agreement that year. Today, one of the masterminds of those
attacks, the Iranian citizen and Shia Muslim teacher, Mohsen
Rabbani, remains not only at large, but extremely active in
recruiting young Brazilians, according to reports in
Brazilian magazine Veja. This region, the third in the world
for cash transactions (behind Hong Kong and Miami),
continues to be an epicenter for the conversion and
recruitment of a new generation of terrorists who then train
in the Middle East and pursue their activities both there
and in the Americas.

According to Lebanon's drug enforcement chief, Col. Adel
Mashmoushi, as cited in The New York Times, a main
transportation route for terrorists, cash and drugs was
aboard a flight commonly referred to as "Aeroterror," about
which I wrote in my May 2011 e-note for FPRI. According to
my own secret sources within the Venezuelan government, the
flight had the route Tehran-Damascus-Caracas-Madrid, where
it would wait for 15 days, and flew under the direct orders
of the Venezuelan Vice-President, according to the captain.
The flight would leave Caracas seemingly empty (though now
it appears it carried a cargo of cocaine) and returned full
of Iranians, who boarded the flight in Damascus, where they
arrived by bus from Tehran. The Iranian ambassador in
Caracas would then distribute the new arrivals all over

I wrote in my May 2011 e-note that reports that Venezuela
has provided Hezbollah operatives with Venezuelan national
identity cards are so rife, they were raised in the July 27,
2010, Senate hearing for the recently nominated U.S.
ambassador to Venezuela, Larry Palmer. When Palmer answered
that he believed the reports, Chavez refused to accept him
as ambassador in Venezuela. Thousands of foreign terrorists
have in fact been given national identity cards that
identify them as Venezuelan citizens and give them full
access to the benefits of citizenship. In 2003, Gen. Marcos
Ferreira, who had been in charge of Venezuela's Department
of Immigration and Foreigners (DIEX) until he decided to
support the 2002 coup against Chavez, said that he had been
personally asked by Ramon Rodr¡guez Chac¡n (who served as
both deputy head of DISIP-Venezuela's intelligence service,
now renamed SEBIN-and Interior Minister under Chavez) to
allow the illegal entry Colombians into Venezuela thirty-
five times and that the DISIP itself regularly fast-tracked
insurgents including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The newly-
minted Venezuelan citizens during Ferreira's tenure include
2,520 Colombians and 279 "Syrians." And that was only during
three of the past twelve years of an increasingly
radicalized Chavez regime.

While Chavez has done more than anyone to strengthen these
relationships with Middle Eastern terrorists, in an attempt
to use what he calls "the International Rebellion"
(including Hezbollah, Hamas and ETA) in order to negotiate
with the US for power in Latin America, the coziness of the
seemingly strange bedfellows dates back to the fall of the
Soviet Union, when the USSR abandoned Cuba. At the Sao Paulo
Forum of 1990, prominent Venezuelans and international
terrorists were all in attendance, including: then-
Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez (against whom
Chavez attempted a coup in 1992); Al¡ Rodr¡guez, then-
President of PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, the government-
owned oil company); Pablo Medina, a left-wing Venezuelan
politician who initially supported Chavez, but has now moved
to the opposition; as well as Fidel Castro, Moammar Qaddafi
and leaders of the FARC, Tupamaros and Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path). The extent to which these alliances have
deepened and become institutionalized is exemplified by the
Continental Bolivarian Coordinator, the office that
coordinates all the Latin American terrorists. According to
a well-placed Venezuelan military source of mine, they are
headquartered in the Venezuelan state of Barinas-the same
state that is effectively a Chavez family fiefdom, with
their sprawling family estate, La Chavera, and their total
control of local politics. Their extreme anti-Semitism is
not ideological, but simply out of convenience: to court and
maintain Iranian support.

According to the Congressional Research Service, with
enactment of the sixth FY2011 Continuing Resolution through
March 18, 2011, (H.J.Res. 48/P.L. 112-6) Congress has
approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military operations,
base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs,
and veterans' health care for the three operations initiated
since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation
Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military
bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Yet for all this massive spending on fighting terrorists and
insurgents in the Middle East, we are leaving ourselves
vulnerable to them here, on a number of fronts. First and
foremost, the United States is under territorial threat
through its Mexican border. Hezbollah operatives have
already been smuggled, along with drugs and weapons, in
tunnels dug under the border with the US by Mexican drug
cartels. Only a week after my October 5th interview by KT
McFarland on Fox, where I specifically warned of a
possibility of this resulting in a terrorist attack carried
out inside the US with the complicity of South American drug
traffickers, the global press revealed a plot by the elite
Iranian Quds Force to utilize the Mexican gang Los Zetas to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in a bombing
that would have murdered many Americans on their lunch hour.

Second, American assets in Latin America are under threat.
Embassies, consulates, corporate headquarters, energy
pipelines and American- or Jewish-sponsored community
centers and American citizens have already been targeted by
terrorist groups all over Latin America for decades: FARC in
Colombia, Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru and
Hezbollah in Argentina. Al Qaeda is also rumored to have a
strong presence in Brazil.

Third, while American soldiers give their lives trying to
defeat terrorists and violent insurgents in the Middle East,
these same groups are being supported and strengthened
increasingly by Latin America, where they receive training,
weapons and cash. This makes American military engagement
far more costly by any metric: loss of life and financial

Indeed over the last decade, Latin America is a region
spiraling ever more out of American control. It is a region
with which the United States has a growing asymmetry of
power: it has more importance to the United States, while
the United States is losing influence over Latin America,
which remains the largest source of oil, drugs and
immigrants, both documented and not. Latinos now account for
15 percent of the US population and nearly 50 percent of
recent US population growth, as well as a growing portion of
the electorate, as seen in the last presidential elections.
The discovery of huge new oil reserves in Brazil and
Argentina, that might even challenge Saudi Arabia, and the
2012 presidential elections in Venezuela, make Latin America
of increasing strategic importance to the U.S., particularly
as the future political landscape of the Middle East becomes
ever more uncertain, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the
political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in previously
secular Arab governments. The growth of transnational gangs
and the resurgence of previously waning terrorist
organizations pose complicated new challenges, as violence
and murder cross the U.S. border, costing American lives and
taking a huge toll on U.S. law enforcement. The United
States needs to develop a smart policy to deal with these

So while the US is expending vast resources on the GWOT, the
terrorists are being armed and reinforced by America's
southern neighbors, making the GWOT far more costly for the
US and directly threatening American security. Even though
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez may be removed from the
presidency either through an electoral loss in the October
7, 2012 presidential elections or through his battle with
cancer, certain sectors of the Venezuelan government will
continue to support international terrorism, whose
activities, bases and training camps have now spread
throughout this region. By understanding the dynamics of the
increasingly entrenched narcoterrorist network, the U.S. can
develop an effective policy to contend with these, whether
or not President Chavez remains in power.

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